Effects of corporate governance and ownership structure on agency cost: Case of listed equitized state-owned enterprises in Vietnam

Le Trung Dao1, Doan Ngoc Phuc2
1 University of Finance – Marketing
2 s:0:"";

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Abstract

The main purpose of this study is to test the relationship between ownership structure, corporate governance, and agency cost of equitized state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Vietnam with the data sources used including 217 companies listed on Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi Stock Exchanges in the period 2009-2019. The explanatory variables include state ownership, managerial ownership, foreign ownership, board size, duality, and board independence. Regression results show that managerial ownership, foreign ownership, board independence, and firm size are negatively related to agency cost. Meanwhile, duality, board size, and state ownership affect positively the agency cost of equitized state-owned enterprises. From a policy perspective, the results of this study suggest some policy implications for resolving conflicts of interest for the type of company with many owners, contributing to improving performance. of equitized state-owned enterprises in Vietnam

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References

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