Mối quan hệ giữa chất lượng quản trị doanh nghiệp, mức độ tập trung ngân hàng và tăng trưởng kinh tế ở việt nam
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Tóm tắt
Bài viết này khảo sát tác động của chất lượng quản trị doanh nghiệp và mức độ tập trung ngân hàng với tăng trưởng kinh tế bằng cách sử dụng dữ liệu bảng cho các ngành kinh tế Việt Nam trong giai đoạn 2006 – 2017. Kết quả cho thấy (i) mức độ tập trung ngân hàng có ảnh hưởng ngược chiều đến sự tăng trưởng của các ngành phụ thuộc nhiều vào nguồn tài trợ bên ngoài; và (ii) chất lượng quản trị doanh nghiệp tốt sẽ làm giảm thiểu tác động của mức độ tập trung ngân hàng đối với tăng trưởng kinh tế. Theo đó, quản trị doanh nghiệp tốt là một phương tiện quan trọng để thúc đẩy tăng trưởng và sự thịnh vượng ở các nền kinh tế đang phát triển và mới nổi như Việt Nam, nơi mà các khu vực tài chính đang phát triển với mức độ tập trung ngân hàng cao.
Chi tiết bài viết
Từ khóa
Chất lượng quản trị doanh nghiệp, mức độ tập trung ngân hàng, tăng trưởng kinh tế
Tài liệu tham khảo
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Attig, N., Guedhami, O., Mishra, D. (2008). Multiple large shareholders, control contests, and implied cost of equity. Journal of Corporate Finance 14, 721-737.
Bai, C.E., Lui, Q., Lu, Z., Song, F.M., Zhang, J. (2004). Corporate governance and market valuation in China. Journal of Comparative Economics 32, 599-616.
Bae, K.-H., Baek, J.-S., Kang, J.-K., Liu, W.-L. (2012). Do controlling shareholders’ expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 105, 412-435.
Balasubramanian, N., Black, B.S., Khauna, V. (2010). The relation between firm-level corporate governance and market value: A case study of India. Emerging Markets Review 11, 319-340.
Black, S.E., Strahan, P.E. (2002). Entrepreneurship and bank credit availability. Journal of Finance 5, 2807- 2833.
Chen, K.C.W, Chen, Z., Wei, K.C.J. (2009). Legal protection of investors, corporate governance, and the cost of equity capital. Journal of Corporate Finance 12, 424-448.
Chen, K.C.W, Chen, Z., Wei, K.C.J. (2011). Agency costs of free cash flows and the effect of shareholder rights on the implied cost of capital. Journal of Finance and Quantitative Analysis 46, 171-207.
Claessens, S., Feijen, E., Laeven, L. (2008). Political connections and preferential access to finance: the role of campaign contributions. Journal of Financial Economics 88, 554-580.
Claessens, S., Ueda, K., Yafeh, Y. (2014). Institutions and financial frictions: Estimating with structural restrictions on firm value and investment. Journal of Development Economics 105, 412-435.
Claessens, S., Yurtoglu, B.B. (2013). Corporate governance in emerging markets. Emerging Markets Review 15, 1-33.
Cornett, M.M., McNutt, J.J., Tehranian, H. (2010). The financial crisis, internal corporate governance, and the performance of publicly-traded U.S. bank holding companies. SSRN: https://ssrn.com/ abstract=1476969.
Cueto, D.C. (2008). Corporate governance and ownership structure in emerging markets: evidence from Latin America. SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1157031.
Cueto, D.C. (2008). Substitutability and complementarity of corporate governance mechanisms in Latin America. International Review of Economics & Finance 25, 310-325.
De Nicolo, G., Laeven, L., Ueda, K. (2008). Corporate governance quality: Trends and real effects. Journal of Financial Intermediation 17, 198-228.
Diallo, B. (2017). Corporate Governance, Bank Concentration and Economic Growth. Emerging Markets Review 32, 28-37.
Diallo, B., Koch, W. (2018). Bank concentration and schumpeterian growth: Theory and international evidence. The Review of Economics and Statistics 100(3). 489-501.
Diallo, B., Zhang, Q. (2017). Bank concentration and sectoral growth: Evidence from Chinese Provinces. Economics Letters 154. 77-80.
Djankov, S., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Porta, R.L., Shleifer, A. (2008b). The law and economics of self-dealing. Journal of Financial Economics 88, 430-465.
Doidge, C., Karolyi, G.A., Stulz, R.M. (2007). Why do countries matter so much for corporate governance? Journal of Financial Economics 86, 1-39.
Faccio, M., McConnell, J.J., Masulis, R.W. (2006). Political connections and corporate bailouts. Journal of Finance 61, 2597-2635.
Fisman, R. (2001). Estimating the value of political connections. American Economic Review 91, 1095- 1102.
Khanna, V., Zyla, R. (2010). Corporate governance matters to investors in emerging Market companies. IFC, The World Bank Group. 1-15.
Khwaja, A.I., Mian, A. (2005). Do lenders favor politically connected firms? Rent provision in an emerging financial market. Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, 1371-1411.
Johnson, S., Boone, P., Breach, A., Friedman, E. (2000). Corporate governance in the Asian financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics 58, 141-186.
Morey, M., Gottesman, A., Baker, E., Godridge, B. (2009). Does better corporate governance result in higher valuations in emerging markets? Another examination using new data set. Journal of Banking and Finance 33(2), 254-262.
Petersen, M.A., Rajan, R.G. (1995). The effect of credit market competition on lending relationships. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 407-443.
Rajan, R., Zingales, L. (1998). Financial dependence and growth. American Economic Review 88, 559-587.
Attig, N., Guedhami, O., Mishra, D. (2008). Multiple large shareholders, control contests, and implied cost of equity. Journal of Corporate Finance 14, 721-737.
Bai, C.E., Lui, Q., Lu, Z., Song, F.M., Zhang, J. (2004). Corporate governance and market valuation in China. Journal of Comparative Economics 32, 599-616.
Bae, K.-H., Baek, J.-S., Kang, J.-K., Liu, W.-L. (2012). Do controlling shareholders’ expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 105, 412-435.
Balasubramanian, N., Black, B.S., Khauna, V. (2010). The relation between firm-level corporate governance and market value: A case study of India. Emerging Markets Review 11, 319-340.
Black, S.E., Strahan, P.E. (2002). Entrepreneurship and bank credit availability. Journal of Finance 5, 2807- 2833.
Chen, K.C.W, Chen, Z., Wei, K.C.J. (2009). Legal protection of investors, corporate governance, and the cost of equity capital. Journal of Corporate Finance 12, 424-448.
Chen, K.C.W, Chen, Z., Wei, K.C.J. (2011). Agency costs of free cash flows and the effect of shareholder rights on the implied cost of capital. Journal of Finance and Quantitative Analysis 46, 171-207.
Claessens, S., Feijen, E., Laeven, L. (2008). Political connections and preferential access to finance: the role of campaign contributions. Journal of Financial Economics 88, 554-580.
Claessens, S., Ueda, K., Yafeh, Y. (2014). Institutions and financial frictions: Estimating with structural restrictions on firm value and investment. Journal of Development Economics 105, 412-435.
Claessens, S., Yurtoglu, B.B. (2013). Corporate governance in emerging markets. Emerging Markets Review 15, 1-33.
Cornett, M.M., McNutt, J.J., Tehranian, H. (2010). The financial crisis, internal corporate governance, and the performance of publicly-traded U.S. bank holding companies. SSRN: https://ssrn.com/ abstract=1476969.
Cueto, D.C. (2008). Corporate governance and ownership structure in emerging markets: evidence from Latin America. SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1157031.
Cueto, D.C. (2008). Substitutability and complementarity of corporate governance mechanisms in Latin America. International Review of Economics & Finance 25, 310-325.
De Nicolo, G., Laeven, L., Ueda, K. (2008). Corporate governance quality: Trends and real effects. Journal of Financial Intermediation 17, 198-228.
Diallo, B. (2017). Corporate Governance, Bank Concentration and Economic Growth. Emerging Markets Review 32, 28-37.
Diallo, B., Koch, W. (2018). Bank concentration and schumpeterian growth: Theory and international evidence. The Review of Economics and Statistics 100(3). 489-501.
Diallo, B., Zhang, Q. (2017). Bank concentration and sectoral growth: Evidence from Chinese Provinces. Economics Letters 154. 77-80.
Djankov, S., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Porta, R.L., Shleifer, A. (2008b). The law and economics of self-dealing. Journal of Financial Economics 88, 430-465.
Doidge, C., Karolyi, G.A., Stulz, R.M. (2007). Why do countries matter so much for corporate governance? Journal of Financial Economics 86, 1-39.
Faccio, M., McConnell, J.J., Masulis, R.W. (2006). Political connections and corporate bailouts. Journal of Finance 61, 2597-2635.
Fisman, R. (2001). Estimating the value of political connections. American Economic Review 91, 1095- 1102.
Khanna, V., Zyla, R. (2010). Corporate governance matters to investors in emerging Market companies. IFC, The World Bank Group. 1-15.
Khwaja, A.I., Mian, A. (2005). Do lenders favor politically connected firms? Rent provision in an emerging financial market. Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, 1371-1411.
Johnson, S., Boone, P., Breach, A., Friedman, E. (2000). Corporate governance in the Asian financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics 58, 141-186.
Morey, M., Gottesman, A., Baker, E., Godridge, B. (2009). Does better corporate governance result in higher valuations in emerging markets? Another examination using new data set. Journal of Banking and Finance 33(2), 254-262.
Petersen, M.A., Rajan, R.G. (1995). The effect of credit market competition on lending relationships. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 407-443.
Rajan, R., Zingales, L. (1998). Financial dependence and growth. American Economic Review 88, 559-587.
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