Tác động của chất lượng báo cáo tài chính và kỳ hạn nợ đến hiệu quả đầu tư: Nghiên cứu tại doanh nghiệp Việt Nam
Nội dung chính của bài viết
Tóm tắt
Bài viết nghiên cứu về tác động của chất lượng báo cáo tài chính (BCTC) và kỳ hạn nợ mà đại diện là nợ ngắn hạn đối với hiệu quả đầu tư của doanh nghiệp (DN) Việt Nam. Nhóm tác giả nghiên cứu tác động này trong tình trạng DN đầu tư quá mức và đầu tư dưới mức trên mẫu nghiên cứu của 105 DN phi tài chính, được niêm yết trên 2 sàn chứng khoán HNX và HOSE tại Việt Nam trong giai đoạn từ năm 2009 đến năm 2017. Vì BCTC là một công cụ hữu ích giúp cho việc đánh giá tình hình tài chính của DN, so sánh DN với các đối thủ cạnh tranh khác nên việc phân tích đánh giá chất lượng BCTC khá quan trọng trong các quyết định đầu tư của nhà quản trị. Kết quả nghiên cứu cho thấy khi chất lượng BCTC tăng và sử dụng nhiều nợ ngắn hạn sẽ giúp DN nâng cao hiệu quả đầu tư, cải thiện vấn đề đầu tư quá mức và tình trạng đầu tư dưới mức tại Việt Nam. Bên cạnh đó, bài viết cũng nghiên cứu mối quan hệ của chất lượng BCTC đến hiệu quả đầu tư của DN ở các mức kỳ hạn nợ khác nhau.
Chi tiết bài viết
Từ khóa
Chất lượng báo cáo tài chính, hiệu quả đầu tư, kỳ hạn nợ
Tài liệu tham khảo
Abel, A. (1983). Optimal investment under uncertainty. American Economic Review, 73, 228-233.
Altman, E. (1968). Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy. The Journal of Finance, 23, 589-609.
Ball, R., & Shivakumar, L. (2005). Earnings quality in UK private firms: comparative loss recognition timeliness. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39, 83-128.
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2003). Enjoying the quiet life? Corporate governance and managerial preference. Journal of Political Economy, 111, 1043-1075.
Biddle, G., & Hilary, G. (2006). Accounting quality and firm-level capital investment. The Accounting review, 81, 963-982.
Biddle, G., Hilary, G., & Verdi, R. S. (2009). How does financial reporting quality relate to investments efficiency? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 48, 112-131.
Bushman, R. M., & Smith, A. J. (2001). Financial accounting information and corporate governance. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 32, 237-333.
Chen, F., Hope, O., Li, Q., & Wang, X. (2011). Financial reporting quality and investment efficiency of private firms in emerging markets. The Accounting review, 86, 1255-1288.
Childs, P. D., Mauer, D. C., & Ott, S. H. (2005). Interactions of corporate financing and investment decisions: the effects of agency conflicts. Journal of Financial Economics, 76, 667-690.
Crotty, J. R. (1992). Neoclassical and Keynesian approaches to the theory of investment. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 14, 483-496.
Dechow, P., & Dichev, I. (2002). The quality of accruals and earnings: the role of accrual estimation errors. The Accounting review, 77, 35-59.
Diamond, D. W. (1991). Debt maturity structure and liquidity risk. Quarterly Journof Economics, 106, 709-737.
D’Mello, R., Miranda, M. (2010). Long-term debt and overinvestment agency problem. Journal of Banking and Finance, 34, 324–335.
Flannery, M. J. (1986). Asymmetric information and risky debt maturity choice. Journal of Finance, 41, 19-37.
García-Lara, J. M., García-Osma, B., & Penalva, F. (2010). Accounting conservatism and firm investment efficiency. Working Paper.
Gomariz, M. F. C., & Ballesta, J. P. S. (2013). Financial reporting quality, debt maturity and investment efficiency. Journal of Banking & Finance, 40, 494-506.
Gordon, M. J. (1992). The Neoclassical and a Post Keynesian Theory of Investment. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 14(4), 425-443.
Guedes, J., & Opler, T. (1996). The determinants of the maturity of corporate debt issues. The Journal of Finance, 51, 1809-1833.
Hayashi, F. (1982). Tobin’s marginal q and average q: a neoclassical interpretation. Econometrica, 50(1), 213-224.
Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: a review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31, 405-440.
Hope, O., & Thomas, W. B. (2008). Managerial empire building and firm disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research, 46, 591-626.
Hubbard, R. G. (1998). Capital-market imperfections and investment. Journal of Economic Literature, 36, 193-225.
Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360.
Jensen, M. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review, 76, 323–329.
Jones, J. (1991). Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of Accounting Research, 29, 193-228.
Kasznik, R. (1999). On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management. Journal of Accounting Research, 37, 57-81.
Lai, K. W. (2011). The cost of debt when all-equity firms raise finance: the role of investment opportunities, audit quality and debt maturity. Journal of Banking and Finance, 35, 1931-1940.
Lambert, R., Leuz, C., & Verrecchia, R. (2007). Accounting information, disclosure, and the cost of capital. Journal of Accounting Research, 45, 385-420.
Leuz, C., Nanda, D., & Wysocki, P. D. (2003). Earnings management and investor protection: an international comparison. Journal of Financial Economics, 69, 505-527.
Magri, S. (2010). Debt maturity choice of nonpublic Italian firms. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 42(2-3), 443-463.
McNichols, M., & Stubben, S. (2008). Does earnings management affect firms investment decisions. The Accounting review, 86, 1571-1603.
Myers, S. C. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 5, 147-175.
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics, 13, 187-221.
Ortiz-Molina, H., & Penas, M. F. (2008). Lending to small businesses: the role of the loan maturity in addressing information problems. Small Business Economics, 30, 361-383.
Parrino, R., & Weisbach, M. S. (1999). Measuring investment distortions arising from stockholder– bondholder conflicts. Journal of Financial Economics, 53, 3-42.
Rajan, R.G. (1992). Insiders and outsiders: the choice between informed and arm’s-length debt. The Journal of Finance, 47, 1367–1400.
Saghafi, A., & Motamedi Fazel, M. (2012). Relation between audit quality and investment efficiency in firms with high investment opportunities. Journal of Financial Accounting Research, 3(4), 1-14.
Stiglitz, J., & Weiss, A. (1981). Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information. American Economic Review, 71, 393-410.
Yoshikawa, H. (1980). On the “q” theory of investment. American Economic Review, 70, 739-743.
Altman, E. (1968). Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy. The Journal of Finance, 23, 589-609.
Ball, R., & Shivakumar, L. (2005). Earnings quality in UK private firms: comparative loss recognition timeliness. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39, 83-128.
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2003). Enjoying the quiet life? Corporate governance and managerial preference. Journal of Political Economy, 111, 1043-1075.
Biddle, G., & Hilary, G. (2006). Accounting quality and firm-level capital investment. The Accounting review, 81, 963-982.
Biddle, G., Hilary, G., & Verdi, R. S. (2009). How does financial reporting quality relate to investments efficiency? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 48, 112-131.
Bushman, R. M., & Smith, A. J. (2001). Financial accounting information and corporate governance. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 32, 237-333.
Chen, F., Hope, O., Li, Q., & Wang, X. (2011). Financial reporting quality and investment efficiency of private firms in emerging markets. The Accounting review, 86, 1255-1288.
Childs, P. D., Mauer, D. C., & Ott, S. H. (2005). Interactions of corporate financing and investment decisions: the effects of agency conflicts. Journal of Financial Economics, 76, 667-690.
Crotty, J. R. (1992). Neoclassical and Keynesian approaches to the theory of investment. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 14, 483-496.
Dechow, P., & Dichev, I. (2002). The quality of accruals and earnings: the role of accrual estimation errors. The Accounting review, 77, 35-59.
Diamond, D. W. (1991). Debt maturity structure and liquidity risk. Quarterly Journof Economics, 106, 709-737.
D’Mello, R., Miranda, M. (2010). Long-term debt and overinvestment agency problem. Journal of Banking and Finance, 34, 324–335.
Flannery, M. J. (1986). Asymmetric information and risky debt maturity choice. Journal of Finance, 41, 19-37.
García-Lara, J. M., García-Osma, B., & Penalva, F. (2010). Accounting conservatism and firm investment efficiency. Working Paper.
Gomariz, M. F. C., & Ballesta, J. P. S. (2013). Financial reporting quality, debt maturity and investment efficiency. Journal of Banking & Finance, 40, 494-506.
Gordon, M. J. (1992). The Neoclassical and a Post Keynesian Theory of Investment. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 14(4), 425-443.
Guedes, J., & Opler, T. (1996). The determinants of the maturity of corporate debt issues. The Journal of Finance, 51, 1809-1833.
Hayashi, F. (1982). Tobin’s marginal q and average q: a neoclassical interpretation. Econometrica, 50(1), 213-224.
Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: a review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31, 405-440.
Hope, O., & Thomas, W. B. (2008). Managerial empire building and firm disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research, 46, 591-626.
Hubbard, R. G. (1998). Capital-market imperfections and investment. Journal of Economic Literature, 36, 193-225.
Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360.
Jensen, M. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review, 76, 323–329.
Jones, J. (1991). Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of Accounting Research, 29, 193-228.
Kasznik, R. (1999). On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management. Journal of Accounting Research, 37, 57-81.
Lai, K. W. (2011). The cost of debt when all-equity firms raise finance: the role of investment opportunities, audit quality and debt maturity. Journal of Banking and Finance, 35, 1931-1940.
Lambert, R., Leuz, C., & Verrecchia, R. (2007). Accounting information, disclosure, and the cost of capital. Journal of Accounting Research, 45, 385-420.
Leuz, C., Nanda, D., & Wysocki, P. D. (2003). Earnings management and investor protection: an international comparison. Journal of Financial Economics, 69, 505-527.
Magri, S. (2010). Debt maturity choice of nonpublic Italian firms. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 42(2-3), 443-463.
McNichols, M., & Stubben, S. (2008). Does earnings management affect firms investment decisions. The Accounting review, 86, 1571-1603.
Myers, S. C. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 5, 147-175.
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics, 13, 187-221.
Ortiz-Molina, H., & Penas, M. F. (2008). Lending to small businesses: the role of the loan maturity in addressing information problems. Small Business Economics, 30, 361-383.
Parrino, R., & Weisbach, M. S. (1999). Measuring investment distortions arising from stockholder– bondholder conflicts. Journal of Financial Economics, 53, 3-42.
Rajan, R.G. (1992). Insiders and outsiders: the choice between informed and arm’s-length debt. The Journal of Finance, 47, 1367–1400.
Saghafi, A., & Motamedi Fazel, M. (2012). Relation between audit quality and investment efficiency in firms with high investment opportunities. Journal of Financial Accounting Research, 3(4), 1-14.
Stiglitz, J., & Weiss, A. (1981). Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information. American Economic Review, 71, 393-410.
Yoshikawa, H. (1980). On the “q” theory of investment. American Economic Review, 70, 739-743.